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I. INTRODUCTION
[S]uddenly some representative of the Department of Labor may
step into one of those industries and say, "You have reached a
collective-bargaining agreement which we do not approve. Hence
the employer must pay for back years the time which everybody
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had considered was excluded as a part of the working day." That
situation may anse at any moment.
-Representative Christian A. Herter'
At first thought, one does not imagine that putting on a particular
article of clothing would constitute compensable work. It seems a matter
of common sense not to expect compensation for putting on clothes in
the morning. But that assumption becomes less stable when, instead of
everyday clothes, one imagines donning protective equipment, and,
instead of one's own home, one imagines changing at the employment
site. Congressional acts have clarified that the act of changing clothes is
not necessarily compensable work.2 But what coverings qualify as
"clothes" is not so clear.
The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") was enacted in 1938. Since
then, the FLSA has been interpreted and reinterpreted by the Supreme
Court, lower federal courts, and federal agencies. Recently, a circuit split
has emerged as to the proper effect of a subsection of the FLSA's
"Definitions" portion, namely § 203(o), which defines "hours worked."
Because the relevant facts of these cases are relatively similar, the
inconsistency among the circuits must be rooted in law.
Although the time that an average employee spends donning and
doffing personal protective equipment ("PPE") in a given day may be less
than fifteen minutes, if such time were compensable and were left to
overtime pay, the aggregate effect could cost employers miions of
dollars. But beyond the monetary liability to employers, and beyond the
uncertainty among employees as to proper compensation, there lies the
substantial amount of judicial resources that have been dedicated to
determining whether or not § 203(o) excludes the time spent donning
and doffing PPE from the compensable workday.' Furthermore, the
amount ofjudicial resources entangled in this dispute has been increasing.
The amount of cases filed in federal court under the FLSA has been
steadily increasing since 1994,s and the total amount of FLSA cases
1 95 CONG. REc. 11,210 (1949) (statement of Rep. Herter) (explaining the need behind § 203(o)).
2 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006).
3 See FSIS Changes to the Schedule of Operations Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 47,726, 47,728 (proposed
Aug. 9, 2010) (finding that overtime payment for the time an employee spent donning and doffing PPE would
cost large meat packing establishments an average of ten and a half million dollars annually).
As an example of this continuous litigation, the Ninth Circuit explained that IBP, Inc. has suffered a
"long-running" litigation revolving around the issue of FLSA compensation. See Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d
894, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) affd on other grounds, 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
5 In 1994, a total of 1545 FLSA cases were filed in federal courts. Judicial Business of the United States
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commenced yearly in federal courts has increased by 2,618 cases from
2006 to 2010.6
This article argues that the "changing clothes" exception codified in
5 203(o) of the FLSA was not meant to be an exemption to the FLSA and
that the phrase "changing clothes" includes the donning and doffing of
PPE. Part II briefly describes the FLSA and offers a concise history of
Supreme Court opinions that ultimately led to the Portal-to-Portal Act.
Part III examines the Ninth Circuit's decision in detail and the contrary
trend that developed afterwards. Part IV explores the relevant case law and
legislative history, and proposes that the "changing clothes" exception in
5 203(o) should include the donning and doffing of PPE and that § 203(o)
is not an exemption to the FLSA. Part V summarizes the discussion and
offers a conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND OF "CHANGING CLOTHES" AS
EXCLUDED FROM "WORK"
Congress enacted the FLSA in a period of widespread
unemployment' in order to eliminate labor conditions that were
"detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living ...
without substantially curtailing employment."' The FLSA established a
minimum hourly wage and a maximum amount of hours that an
employee can work within a week.' Any employer who violates the
nummum wage or maximum hours provisions of the FLSA could be held
liable to the employee for the amount of unpaid time-plus a matching
Courts 1998, tbl.C-2A at 147, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/1998/
appendices/c2asep98.pdf. In 1998, there werel562 FLSA cases filed in federal courts. Id. In 2002, the total FLSA
cases filed in federal courts were 3904; this number rose to 4207 in 2006. Judicial Business of the United States
Courts 2006, tbl.C-2A at 167, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscours/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2006/
appendices/c2a.pdf. And, in 2010, the number of FLSA cases filed in federal courts rose to 6825. Judicial Business
of the United States Courts 2010, tbl.C-2A at 149, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statisncs/
JudicialBusiness/2010/appendices/CO2ASepO.pdf.
6 Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2010, tbl.C-2A at 149, available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/appendices/CO2ASepl0.pdf.
According to a presidential message to Congress, roughly one-third of the population was "ill-
nourished, ill-clad, and ill-housed, and [this situation] called for national action to fix minimum wages and
maximum working week." Paul H. Douglas & Joseph Hackman, The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 1, 53 POL.
Sci. Q., 491, 493 (1938) (quoting a message to Congress from the President) (internal quotation marks omitted),
available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2143527.
8 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2006).
9 Id. % 206, 207.
255
256 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:253
amount in liquidated damages."o However, for the purposes of calculating
minimum hourly wage and maximum workweek hours, the FLSA defines
"hours worked" as excluding any time spent "changing clothes""
neither the word "changing," nor the word "clothes," is defined within
the FLSA.
A. The Definition of "Work" Before the Portal-to-Portal Act
Because the FLSA did not define the terms "work" or "workweek," 1 2
the Supreme Court endeavored to define the parameters of the term
"work" on its own.' In 1944, the Court in Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v.
Muscoda Local No. 123,14 explained that the term "work" included the
following: "physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not)
controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and
primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business."" That same
year, in Armour & Co. v. Wantock,' 6 the Court clarified its definition by
holding that actual exertion is not necessary for an employee's activities to
constitute "work"; in fact, an employee's idleness could fall within the
definition of "work."' 7
Two years later, in Anderson -v. Mount Clemens Pottery," the Court
further expanded the definition of "work" by holding that the term
"workweek" included any time during which an employee is required to
be on the employer's premises." Building on the foundation laid down by
Tennessee Coal and Armour & Co., the Court found that such "work"
included the time an employee spent walking to work on the employer's
premises and time the employee spent engaging in preliminary activities-
such activities included putting on aprons, removing shirts, and taping or
greasing arms.20
10 Id. 5 216(b).
"1 Id. S 203(0).
12 The FLSA does, however, define the term "employ" as including "suffer[ing] or permit[ting] to
work." Id. § 2 03(g).
13 See, e.q., Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944); Armour &
Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944).
14 321 U.S. 590 (1944).
is Id. at 598.
16 323 U.S. 126 (1944).
17 See id. at 133 ("Of course an employer, if he chooses, may hire a man to do nothing, or to do nothing
but wait for something to happen.").
18 328 U.S. 680 (1946).
t9 Id. at 690-91.
20 Id. at 691-93 (finding that such activities were "clearly work falling within the definition enunciated
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B. The Portal-to-Portal Act and the Steiner Test
In response to the Court's expansive definition of "work"-which
created "unexpected liabilities immense in amount and retroactive in
operation upon employers" that were capable of bringing about the
employers' "financial ruin" 2 1-Congress enacted the Portal-to-Portal
Act.2 2 Under the Portal-to-Portal Act, employers are not required to
compensate employees for traveling to and from work, or for engaging in
activities that are preliminary or postliminary to the principal activities for
which the employee is employed.2 3 In Steiner v. Mitchell,24 the Court
expanded the definition of "principal activities," thus affecting what
activities were compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act.25 The Steiner
Court found that those activities that are integral and indispensable to the
principal activities for which the employee is employed are themselves
principal activities.26 In Steiner, those activities that were considered to be
integral and indispensable to the principal activities of battery plant
employees included donning and doffing PPE before engaging in any
principal activities and showering after the completion of those
activities.27
However, the terms "integral" and "indispensable" in the Steiner test
are not synonymous and are not treated equally in every circuit. For
example, the Second Circuit found that donning and doffing PPE is only
"integral" to the employee's principal activity when such principal
activity is performed in a lethal atmosphere. 28 In other words, according
and applied in . .. Tennessee Coal" because these activities constited physical exertion, were done primarily for
the benefit of the employer, and were performed on the employer's premises).
21 29 U.S.C. § 251(a) (2006).
22 Id. §§ 251-62.
23 Id. § 254(a). "Preliminary activities" are those activities in which the employee engages before the
commencement of his or her "principal activity," and "postlininary activities" are those activities engaged in after
the completion of the employee's "principal activity." See 29 C.F.R. § 790.7(b).
24 350 U.S. 247 (1956).
25 Id. at 256.
26 Id.; see also IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 37 (2005) ("[W]e hold that any activity that is 'integral
and indispensable' to a 'principal activity' is itself a 'principal activity' under . . . the Portal-to-Portal Act."); 29
C.F.R. S 790.8(b) (2012) ("The term 'principal activities' includes all activities which are an integral part of a
principal activity."); cf 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c) ("[I]f changing clothes is merely a convenience to the employee and
not directly related to his principal activities, it would be considered as a 'preliminary' or 'postliminary' activity
rather than a principal part of the activity.").
27 Steiner, 350 U.S. at 248.
2s Gorman v. Consol. Edison Corp., 488 F.3d 586, 593 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Adams v. Alcoa, Inc.,
7:07-CV-1291 GHL, 2011 WL 4527664 at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2011) (finding that the PPE worn was not
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to the Second Circuit, the act of donning and doffing any PPE would
only be integral to the principal activity if it would shield the employee
from the destructive element of the workplace, allowing the employee to
enter the deadly setting. Therefore, even though donning and doffing
steel-toed boots, safety goggles, and helmets are activities that may be
indispensible to the principal activities of nuclear power plant employees,
they are not integral to the principal activity because such PPE is not the
particular PPE that would allow entry and immersion into the destructive
element of a nuclear power plant.2 9
The Fourth Circuit, in contrast, found that the Steiner test is "not
confined to the narrow factual circumstances of a lethal manufacturing
environment."o Thus, in the Fourth Circuit, the time spent donning and
doffing protective gear-such as gloves, aprons, safety goggles, and
sleeves-is not only indispensable, but also integral to poultry processing
plants, and such time is compensable under the FLSA.'
The Department of Labor does not make such a distinction between
"integral" and "indispensable." Instead, it defines activities that are
"integral" to a principal activity as those activities that are "indispensable to
[the principal activity's] performance."3 2 Notwithstanding its circular use
of the word "indispensable," the Department of Labor establishes that if
the principal activity cannot be performed without putting on certain
clothes, the act of donning and doffing those clothes at the beginning and
end of the workday are "integral" activities. "On the other hand, if
changing clothes is merely a convenience to the employee and not directly
related to his principal activities, it would be considered as a 'preliminary'
or 'postliminary' activity rather than a principal part of the activity."3 4
Therefore, according to the Department of Labor, although the act of
donning and doffing PPE must be necessary to the performance of the
employee's principal activities to be considered "integral," such acts need
not be necessitated by the presence of a lethal atmosphere.
integral because "there is no evidence in the record from which a reasonable juror could conclude that [the place
of employment] is a 'lethal' environment"); cf Edwards v. City of New York, 08 CIV. 3134 DLC, 2011 WL
3837130 at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2011) (refusing to distinguish Gonnan on the ground that the PPE in the
present case was unavailable to the public). Contra Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 619 (6th Cir. 2010)
(noting that "[tihe Second Circuit's [Gornan] position appears to be unique.").
29 Gorman, 488 F.3d at 592-93.
0 Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 650 F.3d 350, 365 (4th Cir. 2011).
31 Id. at 360, 365.
32 29 C.F.R. S 790.8(c) (2012) (emphasis added).
33 Id.
3 Id.
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C. The Continuous Workday Rule
The Department of Labor has emphasized that the time that § 203(o)
of the Portal-to-Portal Act excludes from "hours worked" is only that
time that is spent on activities that are preliminary or postliminary.3 In
other words, time spent on activities performed in between the
commencement of the first principal activity and the completion of the
last principal activity is included as part of the workday "whether or not
the employee engages in work throughout all of that period." 6 The
Portal-to-Portal Act, therefore, does not affect compensation of such
time. The inclusion of the time in between the first and last principal
activities within the compensable workday is known as the continuous
workday rule.
The Supreme Court, in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez," largely relied on the
continuous workday rule in reaching its decision.38 Following Steiner, the
Court found that because the acts of donning and doffing PPE were
indispensable and integral to the employees' principal activities, donning
and doffing PPE were principal activities themselves." And, because the
time in between the commencement of the first principal activity and
completion of the last principal activity in a day is part of the continuous
workday, any time spent on activities in between donning and doffing
PPE is compensable under the FLSA.40 Therefore, any time spent walking
from the locker room to the production area after donning the required
PPE at the beginning of the workday, and any time spent waiting to doff
PPE at the end of the workday, is covered by the FLSA. 1 However,
because the time spent waiting to don PPE occurs before the actual
donning, which would be the first principal activity of the workday, such
time is not part of the continuous workday and thus not compensable
under the FLSA.42
3s See id. S 790.6(a).
36 Id. S 790.6(b).
37 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
3 The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision on grounds beyond the scope of this
comment. The Court was not concerned with whether or not PPE is "clothes" for the purposes of§ 203(o). See
IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 32 (2005) ("[T]he only question for us to decide is whether ... the walking
between the locker rooms and the production areas is excluded from FLSA coverage by § 4(a)(1) of the Portal-to-
Portal Act.").
3 Id. at 37.
40 Id.
41 Id.
2 Id. at 41-42.
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D. The De Minimis Rule
Another common law doctrine that may determine whether changing
clothes is compensable under the FLSA is the de minimis rule as explained
in Anderson v. Mount Clemens Pottery Co." The Supreme Court in
Anderson found that when the time at issue involves only a few minutes of
work beyond the scheduled working hours, "such trifles may be
disregarded."" Thus, compensable time includes only that time during
which the employee is required to give up "substantial measure of his [or
her] time and effort."" When applying the de minimis rule, several circuits
adopted the test developed in the leading Ninth Circuit case, Lindow v.
United States." The Ninth Circuit's Lindow test considers three factors in
determining whether a certain amount of time is de minimis: "(1) the
practical administrative difficulty of recording the additional time; (2) the
aggregate amount of compensable time; and (3) the regularity of the
additional work. "47
III. "CHANGING CLOTHES" AND THE ANTI-ALVAREZ TREND
Section 203(o) of the FLSA-the subsection that excludes the time
spent "changing clothes" from the definition of "hours worked"-was
enacted in 1949, two years after the enactment of the Portal-to-Portal
Act.4 8 In order to fall outside the scope of 203(o) of the FLSA, the PPE
donned and doffed by employees must be something other than
"clothes." 49  The Occupational Safety and Health Standards Act
("OSHA") defines PPE as "specialized clothing or equipment worn by an
employee for protection against a hazard"; further, it defines "[g]eneral
work clothes" as clothes not intended to function as protection for the
wearer and thus not PPE.so Even though OSHA's definition of PPE was
intended to be used in a different context than that of the cases reviewed
43 328 U.S. 680 (1946).
44 Id. at 692.
45 Id.
46 738 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir. 1984).
47 Id. at 1063. For examples of circuits applying the Lindow test, see Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 650
F.3d 350, 373 (4th Cir. 2011); De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 500 F.3d 361, 374 (3d Cir. 2007); Kosakow v.
New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., P.C., 274 F.3d 706, 719 (2d Cit. 2001); Brock v. Cincinnati, 236 F.3d 793,
804-05 (6th Cir. 2001).
48 DEP'T oF LABOR, ADM'R Op. LETTER, FLSA2002-2 at 1 (June 6, 2002) [hereinafter DEP'T OF
LABOR 2002-2], available at http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/FLSA/2002/2002_0606 2-FLSA.pdf
49 That is, "clothes" as used in S 203(o).
5 29 C.F.R. S 1910.1030(b) (2012).
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in this comment, its definitions may nonetheless be instructive.s'
A. The Circuit Split
Unlike the inquiry as to what was the proper definition of "work,"
the Supreme Court has not yet attempted to answer the question of how
best to define "clothes." In the absence of such guidance, different circuits
have come to different conclusions, relying on diverse schemes of
statutory interpretation. The following subsections will explore the
approaches to the interpretation of § 203(o)'s "changing clothes"
exception that were espoused by the Ninth, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits.
1. The Ninth Circuit Approach
According to the Ninth Circuit, donning and doffing PPE in a meat
processing plant is not "changing clothes."5 2 In Alvarez v. IBP, Inc. ,"' the
Ninth Circuit held that donning and doffing PPE is both integral and
indispensable to the principal activities of meat-processing employees.54
The court, however, made a distinction between unique PPE-like
Kevlar gloves-and non-unique PPE-like hardhats.ss The distinction
between unique and non-unique PPE rests on the respective ease of
donning and doffing such PPE.s" While the Ninth Circuit found that the
ease in donning and doffing non-unique PPE does not make those
activities any less integral or indispensable to the principal activity, it does
render the time required to don and doff such PPE de minimis."
Having found that donning and doffing PPE passes the Steiner test,58
51 Although the OSHA definitions seem to strongly imply that there is a clear distinction between
ordinary clothes and PPE, it is important to note that different circuits have construed OSHA's definitions in
different and inconsistent ways. Compare Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that
OSHA's distinct definitions of PPE and "clothes" underscores the fact that the phrase "changing clothes" means
something different from donning and doffing PPE, which would imply that S 203(o) does not exclude donning
and doffing PPE from "hours worked"), afd on other grounds, 546 U.S. 21 (2005), with Sepulveda v. Allen Family
Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209, 215 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding that because OSHA defines PPE as specialized clothing,
both PPE and ordinary clothes are ultimately "clothes" for the purposes of the FLSA, and the OSHA definitions
therefore imply that donning and doffing PPE would be excluded from "hours worked" by 5 203(o)).
s2 See Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 904-05.
s3 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003).
s4 Id. at 903.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 903-04.
57 Id. at 903 ("The time it takes to perform these rasks vis-a-vis non-umique protective gear is de minimis
as a matter of law.").
ss See discussion supra Part II.B.
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the Ninth Circuit moved on to the issue of whether the time spent
donning and doffing PPE was excluded from compensation by § 203(o) of
the FLSA. The court intended to give the language in § 203(o) its
"ordinary, contemporary, conimon meaning."" It rejected a broad
dictionary definition of "clothing,"6 0 partly because it found that § 203(o)
of the FLSA is an exemption to the FLSA-and as such, must be narrowly
construed against the employer seeking to assert it 6 -and partly because,
as a matter of common sense and ordinary usage of the term, PPE is
simply "different in kind from typical clothing."6 2 Because, according to
the Ninth Circuit, § 203(o) uses the term "clothing" in its ordinary
definition, the "changing clothes" exception to the FLSA was not
intended to include PPE. Therefore, in the Ninth Circuit, § 2 03(o) of the
FLSA does not exclude donning and doffing PPE from "hours worked.""
So, time spent donning and doffing PPE must be compensable.
2. The Fourth Circuit Approach
A trend developed after the Ninth Circuit's Alvarez decision in which
several circuits, in disagreement with the Ninth Circuit, held that donning
and doffing PPE is "changing clothes," and thus not necessarily
compensable under the FLSA because § 203(o) excludes, or allows for the
exclusion of, such time from "hours worked."64 In Sepulveda v. Allen
9 Id. at 904 (quoting United States v. Akintobi, 159 F.3d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
60 Id. at 904-05 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 507 (2d ed. unabr, 1939)) (finding that the dictionary definition of "clothes" would be so expansive
that it would include coverings that are well beyond the ordinary definition of "clothes"; for example, such a
definition would embrace armor, spacesuits, and mascot costumes).
6i Id. at 905 (quoting Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960)) ("The protective gear
at issue does not 'plainly and unmistakably' fit within S 3(o)'s 'clothing' term. Absent such a plain and clear 5 3(o)
fit . . . we construe § 3(o)'s [sic] against the employer seeking to assert it.").
62 Id. ("The admonition to wear warm clothing, for example, does not usually conjure up images of
donning a bullet-proof vest or an environmental spacesuit. Rather, [PPE] generally refers to materials wom ...
to provide a barrier against exposure to workplace hazards.").
63 Id. at 904. Although the Alvarez court ultimately held that donning and doffing non-unique PPE is
not compensable under the FLSA, it found that those acts are nonetheless covered by "hours worked" of§ 203(o).
Id. Only because the time required to don and doff non-unique PPE was de minimis did the Ninth Circuit find
that such time was not compensable. See id.
64 See generally Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, 644 F.3d 1130, 1140 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that donning
and doffing mesh gloves, arm guards, and knife holders are not so "different in kind from traditional clothing that
it should not be considered 'clothes' [under the FLSA]"); Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 614-15 (6th
Cir. 2010) (holding that frozen foods workers' uniforms and PPE-including haimets, safety glasses, ear plugs, an
hard hats-are "clothes" under the FLSA); Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 614 F.3d 427, 428 (7th Cit. 2010)
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Family Foods, Inc.," the Fourth Circuit held that § 203(o) of the FLSA
does not automatically preclude compensation for time spent changing
clothes.66 However, according to Sepulveda, § 203(o) does provide that
employers are not required to compensate employees for such time.' The
Fourth Circuit set out to construe "changing clothes" by its ordinary
meaning, but unlike the Ninth Circuit in Alvarez, the Fourth Circuit
based its construction of the phrase on dictionary definitions of its
terms.6 ' Because § 203(o) does not qualify the term "clothes" with
adjectives such as "ordinary" or "street," the court found that § 203(o)
was intended to include any and all coverings of the human body, which
would include PPE. 69
The employees in Sepulveda argued that even if PPE were considered
"clothes" under the FLSA, the acts of donning and doffing PPE could not
be construed as "changing" clothes because such acts do not require an
exchange of clothing; instead, those acts entail only a layering of protective
gear on top of other clothes, which the employees do not take off before
donning the PPE.7 o Therefore, the employees argued, the time spent
donning and doffing PPE is not excluded by § 203(o). The court once
again relied on dictionary definitions and held that the term "changing"
does not require an exchange or substitution of clothes; a "change" can
occur when something is simply modified.' Thus, according to the
Fourth Circuit, donning and doffing PPE is "changing clothes," and the
(holding that the FLSA does not require employers to compensate meat production employees for time spent
donning and doffing steel-toed boots, hard hats, smocks, haimets, and beard nets because such PPE is "clothes"
under the FLSA); Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209, 215-18 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that
poultry workers' PPE-including steel-toe boots, smocks, aprons, safety glasses, ear plugs, bump caps, hairnets,
rubber gloves, and arm shields-is "clothes" under the FLSA); Anderson v. Cagle's, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 955-56
(11th Cir. 2007) (holding that poultry workers' PPE is "clothes" under the FLSA).
65 591 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2009).
66 Id. at 219 ("We stress that our decision does not leave these employees without protection."); see also
id. at 211 ("Our holding, of course, does not mean that employees should not be paid for time spent donning and
doffing protective gear.").
67 Sepulveda, 591 F.3d at 219.
68 Id. at 214-15 ("[Clothing] is defined as 'covering for the human body or garments in general: all the
garments and accessories worn by a person at any one time.' . .. [T]his definition is consistent with the common
understanding of the word." (quoting WEsI-ER'S THIRD NEW INTFRNATIONAi DiCTIONARY 428 (unabr.
1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
69 Id. at 215.
70 Id. at 216.
71 Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 373 (unabr. 1986)) ("To
'change' means 'to make different,' that is 'to modify in some particular way but short of conversion to something
else."'); see also Anderson v. Cagle's, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 956 (11th Cir. 2007) ("[W]e conclude that one need
not exchange clothes to change clothes for the purpose of applying S 203(o).").
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time spent donning and doffing PPE is not included in the definition of
"hours worked" under the FLSA.
Having established that donning and doffing PPE was excluded from
"hours worked" by § 203(o), the Fourth Circuit explained that its
construction of the FLSA does not leave employees without protection.7 2
The court found that § 203(o) does not prohibit employees from seeking
compensation for donning and doffing PPE, nor does it prohibit
employers from compensating employees for such time; it merely
guarantees that such compensation is not required of employers and
entrusts all consideration of that compensation to the parties' collective
bargaining process.7 Basing its holding on its interpretation of
congressional intent, the Fourth Circuit found that § 203(o) was
implemented by Congress as a way to grant private parties "greater
discretion to define the outer limits of the workday." 74 Because employers
and unions are better equipped than courts or agencies to calculate how
much compensable time should be allocated to donning and doffing PPE,
both the employer and employees would be more satisfied with the
outcome of a collective bargaining process than had the amount of
compensable time been calculated and imposed by the court.
3. The Tenth Circuit Approach
In Salazar v. Butterball, LLC,7 6 the Tenth Circuit also found that
donning and doffing PPE was "changing clothes" for the purposes of the
FLSA, and thus, the time spent on such endeavors is excluded from
coverage.77 But unlike the Ninth Circuit or the Fourth Circuit, the Tenth
Circuit affirmatively held that the term "clothes" is ambiguous."
However, the court ultimately resolved the ambiguity in favor of the
employer for several reasons.
First, in contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit found that
§ 203(o) was not an exemption to the FLSA, and should therefore not be
read narrowly against the employer seeking to assert it.0 The Tenth
72 Sepulveda, 591 F.3d at 218-19.
7 Id. at 219.
74 Id. at 218.
7 Id.
76 644 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2011).
7 Id. at 1140-41.
78 Id. at 1137.
79 Id. at 1140-41 ("We . . . hold that 'clothes' under 29 U.S.C. S 203(o) includes the PPE .
s Id. at 1138.
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Circuit reasoned that % 203(o) was not an exemption to the FLSA because
all exemptions to the FLSA are specifically delineated in a different section
of the FLSA."' Thus, because the "changing clothes" phrase is included in
§ 203, Congress did not specifically designate it as an exemption to the
FLSA; at most, the "changing clothes" clause limits the definition of the
term "hours worked." This conclusion is supported by the fact that § 203
of the FLSA is titled "Definitions" and § 213 is titled "Exemptions." 8 2
Furthermore, "§ 203(o) removes only particular discrete activities from
the definition of hours worked, whereas the § 213 exemptions remove
entire classes of employees from FLSA coverage."8 Finally, according to
the Tenth Circuit, § 203(o) does not entirely remove the act of changing
clothes from coverage under the FLSA; instead, like the Fourth Circuit,
the Tenth Circuit found that § 203(o) offers employers and employees the
option to remove such activities from coverage through the collective
bargaining process.84
Second, as in Alvarez and Sepulveda, the Tenth Circuit claimed to base
its construction on the ordinary meaning of the term "clothes.""
Following the Fourth Circuit's decision in Sepulveda, the Tenth Circuit
guided its analysis of the meaning of "changing clothes" by referring to
dictionary definitions. However, unlike Sepulveda, the Tenth Circuit also
relied on the fact that the PPE in question-boots, sleeves, gloves, and
hats-would be considered "clothes" if "worn on the street."" The
Tenth Circuit rejected the employees' argument that PPE is different from
"clothes" because it is designed to protect against workplace hazards."
The court reasoned that many items of "everyday" clothing are designed
to protect the wearer of such clothes in some way.
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit found that the PPE at issue was not "so
cumbersome, heavy, complicated, or otherwise diferent in kind from
8 See id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 213 (2006).
82 See 29 U.S.C. %§ 213, 203.
83 Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1138; see also 29 U.S.C. § 213; cf Salazar, 644 F.3d at1138 n.5 (distinguishing a
previous case that assumed that 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(c)(ii)(II) was an exemption from the FLSA on the ground
that § 203(e)(2)(c)(ii)(II)-which excludes the personal staff of government employees from the definition of
"employee"-excludes an entire class of employees from FLSA coverage, and is therefore similar to § 213).
84 Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1138.
85 Id. at 1139.
86 Id. (citing OXFORD ENuISH DICTIONARY (2010 ed.)) ("The ordinary meaning of the term 'clothes'
is quite broad and . . . encompass[es] all the items of PPE worn by plaintiffs.").
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1140.
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traditional clothing that it should not be considered 'clothes.' "" Because
the Tenth Circuit constructed its holding at least in part on the basis that
the particular PPE in question was not sufficiently different in kind to
ordinary clothes, the court allowed the argument that, in the Tenth
Circuit, not all PPE is "clothes" under the FLSA. Thus, if a particular
piece of PPE were so different in kind from ordinary clothes-whether it
is significantly more cumbersome or complicated-it would not be
"clothes" for the purposes of the FLSA, and would therefore require
compensation."
Finally, the Tenth Circuit found that its construction of § 203(o)
would not discourage employees and employers from using PPE for two
reasons.92 First, the court's construction of § 203(o) does not affect
whether relevant laws require that certain employees don PPE." Second,
the possibility of receiving some compensation for time spent donning
and doffing PPE is still available to employees through the collective
bargaining process."
B. Department of Labor Opinions
The judiciary was not alone in generating the confusion surrounding
the question of whether the acts of donning and doffing PPE are
considered "changing clothes" for the purposes of compensation under
the FLSA. The Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor
("DOL") contributed to the conundrum in a series of contradictory
opinion letters.
In 1997, DOL published an opinion letter addressing the issue. In its
opinion letter, DOL explained that the "changing clothes" exception "in
§ 203(o) does not include the putting on, [or] taking off . . . [of]
protective safety equipment."9 6 In reaching this conclusion, DOL relied
on two considerations. First, DOL considered the plain meaning of the
90 Id. (emphasis added).
91 In fact, the court expressly supports its holding on such considerations. See id. ("The plaintiffs' unique
PPE is not so ... different in kind from traditional clothing ... These items are quite similar to ordinary gloves,
sleeves, and belts or holsters. Thus, we conclude that all PPE at issue in this case is clothing under 29 U.S.C.




95 See generally DEPT OF LABOR, AoM'R Op. LETTrER (Dec. 3, 1997) [hereinafter DEPT OF LABOR
1997], available at 1997 WL 998048.
96 Id. at *2.
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term "clothes" and concluded that the term "clothes" does not
encompass PPE.17 Its conclusion relied on "common usage," which,
according to DOL, "dictates that 'clothes' refer to apparel, not to [PPE]
which is generally worn over such apparel and may be cumbersome in
nature."" Second, like the Ninth Circuit's decision in Alvarez, DOL
found that § 203(o) was an exemption from the FLSA and must therefore
be read narrowly against the employer seeking to assert it." However,
DOL did not offer any reasoning or justification for its conclusion that
5 203(o) was an exemption to the FLSA.'oo
In 2002, DOL released another opinion letter opining on the proper
interpretation of the term "clothes" in § 203(o).' In this opinion letter,
DOL found that "changing clothes" as used in § 2 03(o) does include the
acts of donning and doffing PPE. 10 2 First, DOL looked to congressional
intent. It found that, although there is no portion of legislative history that
specifically addressed the proper scope of § 203(o), Congress likely
intended § 203(o) to function as a means of allowing employers and
unions to bargain freely.1o3 Second, DOL reasoned that whether a
particular article of clothing is cumbersome or not is "no indication that it
is not clothing."1 04 In part, DOL found that the cumbersome nature of a
covering is not dispositive of the question of whether it is "clothes" under
5 203(o) because the difference between what is "cumbersome" and what
is not is vague and fails to provide guidance to employers and unions. 0 5
Third, DOL reasoned that just because an article of clothing is worn on
top of another article of clothing does not mean that both are not articles
of clothing.o
DOL reaffirmed its 2002 opinion in 2007. It specifically found that,
notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit's Alvarez opinion, § 203(o) excludes
donning and doffing PPE from "hours worked" because donning and
9 Id. at *1.
9 Id. at *1 (emphasis added).
9 Id.
10 In assuming, without discussion, that § 203(o) is an exemption to the FLSA, the DOL relied on a
Supreme Court case, not about § 203, but concerning § 213 of the FLSA-the section specifically titled
"Exemptions." See id. (citing Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 391-92 (1960)).
101 DEPT OF LABOR 2002-2, supra note 48.
102 Id.
i03 Id. at 2, 3.
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doffing PPE is "changing clothes.""o' DOL went on to conclude that
donning and doffing PPE "cannot be considered principal activities and
[therefore] do not start the workday."os
In 2010, DOL once again changed its position on the proper
interpretation of § 203(o) and found that donning and doffing PPE is not
"changing clothes" for the purposes of compensation under the FLSA.'0o
In developing this opinion letter, DOL explicitly rejected any substantial
reliance on dictionary definitions of the term "clothes.""o Instead, it
relied on what little legislative history there is behind the enactment of
§ 203(o)."' DOL found that the type of "clothes" that Congress had in
mind when the Congressional Conference Committee reviewed the bill
that eventually became § 203(o) was very different from modern-day PPE
donned and doffed by employees in contemporary plants. 1' 2 According to
DOL, at that time, what Congress had in mind were the clothes that
workers in the bakery industry of the 1940s donned and doffed."'
Therefore, DOL concluded that the construction of the term "clothes"
that was offered by the Ninth Circuit, and the three district courts that
followed it,11 4 were "more faithful to the legislative intent behind the Fair
Labor Standards Act" because they found that the acts of donning and
doffing modem-day PPE were not encompassed by "changing clothes" in
107 DEP'T OF LABOR, ADM'R Op. LETTER, FLSA2007-10 at 2 (May 14, 2007), available at http://www.
dol.gov/WHD/opinion/FLSA/2007/2007 05_14_10 FLSA.pdf ("The Division has not changed its
interpretation as a result of the circuit court's opinion and continues to believe that the opinion letter is correct
... [and may be relied on] for practices outside states within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit.").
108 Id. at 1.
10 DEP'T OF LABOR, ADM'R Op. LETTER, FLSA2010-2 at 4 (June 16, 2010) [hereinafter DEP'T OF
LABOR 2010-2], available at http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminlntrprtn/FLSA/2010/FLSAAI2010 2.
pdf ("[lit is the Administrator's interpretation that the § 203(o) exemption does not extend to protective
equipment worn by employees that is required by law, by the employer, or due to the nature of the job.... Those
portions of the 2002 opinion letter that address the phrase "changing clothes" and the 2007 opinion letter in its
entirety, which are inconsistent with this interpretation, should no longer be relied upon.").
no Id. at 2 ("Dictionary definitions offer little useful guidance here,").
in Id. ("The legislative history surrounding S 2 03(o) is sparse but instructive.").
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 See In re Cargill Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F. Supp. 2d 368, 385 (M.D. Pa. 2008)
(holding that PPE such as a smock, hard hat, hair net, ear plugs, steel-toed boots, and cut resistant gloves are not
clearly and unmistakably recognized as clothing); Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 860, 868
(W.D. Wis. 2007) (holding that a hard hat, steel-toed shoes, ear plugs, haimet, and safety glasses are not "clothes"
within the meaning of§ 203(o)); Gonzalez v. Farmington Foods, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 912, 930 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
("[Dionning and doffing of sanitary and safety equipment does not constitute 'changing clothes' under Section
203(o).").
2013] CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 203(o) OF THE FLSA
203(o).'s
IV. SECTION 203(0) AND THE "CHANGING
CLOTHES" EXCEPTION
So, which construction of § 203(o) is correct? Confusion as to the
proper interpretation of § 203(o) has spread throughout the circuits and
even within DOL. Most circuits disagree with the Ninth Circuit and hold
that the donning and doffing of PPE is "changing clothes" under
§ 203(o).1" The majority of circuits have the better argument here for the
following five reasons: first, the definition of "clothes" is ambiguous and
does not, on its own, dispose of the inquiry of proper statutory
construction; second, the legislative history behind § 203(o) strongly
supports the conclusion that 203(o) is not an exemption to the FLSA
and consequently that the term "clothes" was meant to include PPE;
third, read as a whole, 5 203(o) merely attempts to leave questions of
compensation for "changing clothes" up to the collective bargaining
process; fourth, because of their inconsistency, DOL opinions do not lend
support to either interpretation; and fifth, the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of § 203(o) would lead to absurd results if it were read
against the backdrop of Supreme Court decisions and other relevant
common law doctrines.1 17
A. Definition of "Clothes"
In all cases of statutory construction, the judicial inquiry must begin
with the language of the statute." If the language of the statute is
1s DEP'T OF LABoR 2010-2, supra note 108, at 3.
16 See discussion supra Part III.A.
17 Simply because a particular activity may be excluded from "hours worked," it does not necessarily
follow that that activity is not a principal activity. Donning PPE may well begin the workday. In fact, § 203(o)
only allows exclusion of donning and doffing PPE from compensation under the FLSA; it does not per se make
those activities something other than "work." See Figas v. Horsehead Corp., No. 06-1344, 2008 WL 4170043, at
*20 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 2008) ("While § 203(o) permits employers and employees to exclude 'any time spent in
changing clothes . . . at the beginning or end of each workday' from 'the hours for which an employee is
employed,' it does not make donning and doffing activities any less 'integral and indispensable' to the employees'
performance of their daily tasks." (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006))). In May 2012, the Seventh Circuit
disagreed with this notion. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 596-97 (7th Cit. 2012). The
Honorable Richard A. Posner, writing for the majority, found that the FLSA allows for an agreement between
the employer and employee to "reclassify" what constitutes work. Id. Once donning and doffing PPE is
reclassified is as non-work, then donning and doffing PPE cannot be a principal employment activity. Id.
118 See, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002).
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unambiguous, and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, the
inquiry ceases at that point." 9 Therefore, in construing the language of a
statute, a court must first determine whether the statutory language is
unambiguous. When making such a determination, however, the court
will assume that the ordinary meaning of the statutory language
"accurately expresses the legislative purpose."' 20  But what, or who,
should determine the ordinary meaning of "clothes"? The Ninth Circuit
relied, in part, on its own understanding of the word.' 2 ' However, a
scheme of statutory construction that relies on subjective evocations of the
particular court before which the question is presented is highly unlikely
to lead to consistency' 2 2 among the circuits.123
In an attempt to nurture some consistency, some circuit courts have
relied on dictionary definitions. This endeavor, however, is not dispositive
of the issue either. Since the enactment of§ 203(o), the official dictionary
definition of "clothes" has changed slightly-but enough to affect the
construction of § 203(o). At the time when § 203(o) was enacted, the
definition of "clothes," according to Webster's Second New International
Dictionary, was as follows: "covering for the human body . . . a general
term for whatever covering is worn, or is made to be worn, for decency or
comfort."' 24 This definition of "clothes" takes into account the purpose for
which one dons certain coverings. If a covering were donned for some
purpose other than decency or comfort-for example, if a covering were
worn to protect against some lethal element-that covering would not be
"1' Id. (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)).
120 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009) (citing Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air
Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121 The Ninth Circuit found that when one imagines wearing "clothes," or wearing "warm clothes,"
one does not conjure up PPE-such as bulletproof vests. See Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir.
2003), affd on other grounds, 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
122 In fact, any individual can conjure up one of two similar-but ultimately inconsistent-seemingly
ordinary meanings for the term "clothes": first, one may imagine "clothes" as generally including all articles used
to cover the human body; second, one may imagine "clothes" as including such articles as is commonly used to
cover oneself-for decency. The first definition would include PPE, while the second would exclude it.
However, both definitions have their own flaws: the first would include a space suit and a costume-which would
go against the ordinary nature of the definition-and the second definition loses some credibility when one
considers that the term "clothes" is not preceded by qualifying terms like "ordinary" or "everyday."
123 Compare Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 905 (finding that PPE is not "clothes"), with Bejil v. Ethicon, Inc., 269
F.3d 477, 480 n.3 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that a construction of"clothes" that would consider PPE as something
other than "clothes" would be "nonsensical").
124 Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 2:07-CV-443 RM, 2009 WL 3430222, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 15,
2009) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing WEBsTER's SECOND NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 507 (1957)).
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"clothes." Thus, under this definition, PPE would not be considered
"clothes" because such coverings-like aprons, hairnets, and gloves-are
not worn for decency or comfort; they are required by the employer for
the purpose of protection and in some instances may even lead to
discomfort.
In 1961, Merriam-Webster issued the third edition of its New
International Dictionary.125 In Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, "clothes" is defined as "clothing," which in turn is defined as
follows: "covering for the human body or garments in general: all the
garments and accessories worn by a person at any one time. "126 This new
definition is significantly broader than the previous definition because it
does not take into account the purpose for which the clothes are worn.
Under this newer definition, PPE would be considered "clothes" because
it covers the human body and is worn by an employee at one time.
Therefore, if a court were to rely on this dictionary definition of the term
"clothes," it would conclude that PPE is "clothes" under 203(o) of the
FLSA.
Courts that rely on their own understandings of the proper definition
of "clothes" would-and have-come to contradictory conclusions.
However, even if courts were to rely on dictionary definitions of the term
"clothes," such reliance would not definitively answer the question of
what the proper ordinary meaning of "clothes" would be because there
are inconsistencies among dictionaries as to the proper definition.
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit was correct in holding that the term
"clothes" is ambiguous.127 Because the meaning of the term "clothes" is
ambiguous, the courts' inquiry cannot end here. Courts must take into
consideration other aspects of the statute to ascertain the proper
construction of its terms.
B. Legislative History
In Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc.,128 the Supreme Court concluded that
any exemption to the FLSA must "be narrowly construed against the
employers seeking to assert [it]," and its application must be "limited to
those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and
125 About Us: Merriam-Webster's Ongoing Commitment, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/info/commitment.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).
126 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGiLISH LANGUAGE 428 (unabr.
1993).
127 Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, 644 F.3d 1130, 1137 (10th Cir. 2011).
12 361 U.S. 388 (1960).
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spirit."1 29 Because the word "clothes" is ambiguous, its proper
construction may turn on whether it should be read narrowly against the
employer or not. In other words, the construction may turn on whether
% 203(o) is an exemption to the FLSA. Thus, if 5 203(o) is an exemption,
categorically excluding time spent "changing clothes" from "hours
worked," then that exemption must be read narrowly against the
employer, and the term "clothes" should therefore not include PPE
because such inclusion would arguably benefit the employer."o
Conversely, if § 203(o) is not an exemption, then Arnold does not require
that "clothes" be read against the employer. Despite the fact that
exemptions to the FLSA are specifically codified in § 213, and despite the
fact that the Court in Arnold was concerned with only that section, several
courts have found that § 203(o) is an exemption to the FLSA and that it,
like any other exemption to the FLSA, should be construed narrowly
against the employer seeking to assert it.'
The legislative history behind § 203(o) strongly supports the
proposition that § 203(o) is not an exemption to the FLSA. The main
purpose of § 203(o), according to Representative Christian A. Herter,13 2
was to avoid "another series of incidents which led to the portal-to-portal
legislation."' 3 3 The series of incidents referred to by Representative
Herter, which led to the enactment of the Portal-to-Portal Act, was part
of a trend in the Supreme Court that continuously found in favor of
employees and against employers by expanding the definition of
compensable "work."1 34 Representative Herter's statement makes clear
that one is meant to read § 203(o) in favor of employers. In other words,
to read § 203(o) as an exemption would require it be read against the
employers that it was meant to protect. Accordingly, Representative
Herter's assertion is best understood as explaining that the purpose of
5 203(o) was to prevent the courts from being too employee-friendly and
creating unexpected and immense liabilities on employers.' Put simply,
the very spirit of § 203(o) counsels against a construction that would
129 Id. at 391.
130 The employer would benefit from this construction because, as construed, 5203(o) would prohibit
compensation for the time employees spend donning and doffing PPE.
131 See In re Cargill Meat Solutions Wage & Hour Litig., 632 F. Supp. 2d 368, 383-84 (M.D. Pa. 2008);
Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2003), af'd on other grounds, 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
132 Representative Herter was the sponsor of the bill that later became § 203(o). See 95 CONG. REC.
11,210 (1949) (statement of Rep. Herter).
133 Id.
13 See supra Part II.A.
135 See 29 U.S.C. § 251(a) (2006).
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render it an exemption to the FLSA.'
Furthermore, the bill that eventually became § 203(o) originally
allowed "any time" spent by employees to be excluded from "hours
worked," not just the time spent "changing clothes."1 3 7 This original draft
of the bill passed through the House of Representatives.1 3' The
Conference Committee reviewing the bill amended it to limit the time
that can be excluded to only such time spent "changing clothes."' 3 1 If one
were to read § 203(o) as the Ninth Circuit reads it,"'o 203(o) would
categorically exclude the time spent "changing clothes" from "hours
worked.""' Therefore, one would have to read the bill's original draft as
categorically excluding certain time from "hours worked" as well. But, as
it was originally drafted and passed by the House of Representatives, the
bill excluded "any time" spent on any activity that the employee
performed from "hours worked."14 2  Consequently, if the original
incarnation were an exemption, the bill, as passed by the House of
Representatives, would have categorically excluded "any time" from
"hours worked." "Any time" can mean either some or all time spent by
an employee on any activity. 143 If it were an exemption, the original bill
would exclude all time an employee spent on any activities from "hours
worked." Such a reading would practically repeal the FLSA by amending
its "Definitions" section-an absurd result. If one were to read the bill as
excluding some time from "hours worked," it would not be categorically
excluding time spent on any particular activity from "hours worked"; this
136 One may argue, however, that if § 203(o) were an exemption, it would be more beneficial to the
employer-and thus more in line with the purpose for its enactment-because it would require that the employer
not pay the employee for a particular activity. Despite the fact that such a reading would force an employer to a
particular line of conduct-and thus removing a bargaining chip from the collective bargaining table-the
"changing clothes" exception was meant to benefit employers by refraining from requiring compensation, not by
requiring non-compensation. See infra Part IV.C.
137 95 CONG. REC. 11,210 (1949) (statement of Rep. Herter).
138 DiPr oF LAnoR 2002-2, supra note 48.
139 H.R. REP. No. 81-1453, at 16 (1949) (Conf. Rep.), ("The conference agreement limits this
exclusion to time spent by the employee in changing clothes . . . at the beginning or at the end of each
workday."), reprinted in 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2251, 2255.
io The Ninth Circuit read § 203(o) as an exemption to the FLSA. See Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d
894, 905 (9th Cir. 2003), afd on otier grounds, 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
1S The delineated exemptions to the FLSA categorically exclude classes of employees from coverage. See
generally 29 U.S.C. § 213 (2006).
i42 95 CONG. REc. 11,210 (1949) (statement of Rep. Herter).
143 See WEBSTER'S TiiRD NEW INITERNATIONAi DICTIONARY OF' TIE ENGLIsH LANGUAGE 97
(unabr. 1993) (defning "any" as one or all).
273
274 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 21:253
would render the amendment vague."'
Because reading § 203(o) as an exemption would render its original
draft a bill that yields absurd results, § 203(o) is best construed as not being
an exemption. And because § 203(o) cannot be interpreted as an
exemption to the FLSA, it should not be read narrowly against the
employer. The legislative history behind § 203(o), therefore, does not
lend support to the assertion that donning and doffing PPE is not
"changing clothes." Furthermore, because the motivating force behind
the enactment of § 203(o) is employer-friendly, "changing clothes"
would best be read as incorporating the donning and doffing of PPE.
Hence, the term "clothes" in § 203(o) likely includes PPE. And such time
as is spent donning and doffing PPE-or changing clothes-could be
excluded from "hours worked."
Such an exclusion, however, should not be interpreted as an outright
prohibition on compensation for the time an employee spends donning
and doffing PPE.'" The original bill is best read as a provision that
allowed the employers and unions, through the collective bargaining
process, to exclude "any time" that they agreed on from "hours worked"
for the purposes of calculating maximum hours.14 6 Therefore, the time
spent "changing clothes" is not categorically excluded from "hours
worked"; instead, § 203(o) leaves the exclusion of time spent "changing
clothes" from "hours worked" up to the collective bargaining process.
Indeed, Representative Herter made such a construction explicit on the
House floor: "This amendment is offered . . . to give sanctity once again
to the collective-bargaining agreements as being a determining factor in
finally adjudicating that type of arrangement . . . ."147 The type of
arrangement to which Representative Herter referred was any agreement
that employers and unions reached as to the proper compensation for any
time an employee spent on an activity.
C. Reading 5 203(o) as a Whole
Read as a whole, § 203(o) is a simple provision that attempts to shield
the collective bargaining process from an overreaching judiciary or
144 In fact, because such a construction offers no guidance as to what time is excluded, the bill would be
rendered superfluous.
145 To read § 203(o) as prohibiting compensation for the time spent donning and doffing PPE would
effectively render it an exemption.
146 This reading is consistent with the employer-friendly motivation behind the bill because it would
protect the employer from court opinions that require such compensation.
147 95 CONG. Rc. 11,210 (1949) (statement of Rep. Herter).
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agency.148 Section 203(o) reads as follows:
Hours Worked.-In determining for the purposes of sections 206
and 207 of this title the hours for which an employee is employed,
there shall be excluded any time spent in changing clothes . .. at
the beginning or end of each workday which was excluded from
measured working time during the week involved by the express
terms of or by custom or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining
agreement applicable to the particular employee.14 9
This section can best be understood as a conditional statement. In order
for time spent donning and doffing PPE to be excluded from coverage
under the FLSA, two conditions must be met: first, such PPE must be
"clothes" for the purposes of § 203(o);s 0 second, such time spent must be
excluded from the workday by "express terms or by custom or practice
under" a collective bargaining agreement."' Therefore, § 203(o) does not
prevent employees from receiving compensation for donning and doffing
PPE, nor does it prohibit employers from offering such compensation to
employees. Section 203(o) does not categorically exclude the time spent
donning and doffing PPE from "hours worked"; it does, however, allow
employers to opt out of such compensation through a bona fide collective
bargaining agreement.' 5 2 As a matter of policy, this reading of § 203(o)
would lead to greater satisfaction among both employers and employees
than would result from a court- or agency-imposed compensation
scheme.'
148 Such overreaching had previously resulted in the need for the Portal-to-Portal Act. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 251(a) (2006) ("Congress finds that the [FLSA] . . . has been interpreted judicially in disregard of long-
established customs, practices, and contracts between employers and employees . .. [I]f said Act as so interpreted
. . . were permitted to stand, . . . [it would] constitute[] a substantial burden on connerce and a substantial
obstruction to the free flow of goods in commerce.").
149 Id. § 203(o) (emphasis added).
i50 As argued in the previous sections, the term "clothes" includes PPE. See infra Parts IV.A-B.
151 29 U.S.C. § 203(o).
i52 This notion has support in the circuits. See Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, 644 F.3d 1130, 1138 (10th Cir.
2011) ("[Section] 203(o) . .. gives employers and employees the option of removing those activities from FLSA
coverage through collective bargaining."); Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209, 214 (4th Cir.
2009) ("Section 203(o) applies to donning and doffing of [PPE] . . . if [the] two conditions are met.").
153 See 95 CONG. REc. 11,210 (1949) (statement of Rep. Herter) ("In some ... collective-bargaining
agreements the time taken to change clothes . . . is considered a part of the working day. In other collective-
bargaining agreements it is not so considered. But, in either case the matter has been carefully threshed out
between the employer and the employee and apparently both are completely satisfied with respect to their
bargaining agreements."); see also Sepulveda, 591 F.3d at 218 ("[Clollective bargaining allows employers and
unions to reach agreements that leave both sides more satisfied than a government-imposed solution would.").
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D. The DOL Opinion Letters
It has long been established that if an agency offers inconsistent
opinions as to the proper construction of its regulations and statutes,
courts should not afford that agency the same amount of deference that it
would otherwise deserve.' Because it has held inconsistent opinions in
regard to the proper interpretation of 5 203(o), DOL's opinion letters
would not be entitled to much deference by courts. In fact, several circuits
have expressly held that the DOL opinion letters are not entitled to any
deference.'5 However, a review of the DOL opinion letters and their
respective justifications may be instructive as to the proper interpretation
of% 203(o).
In several occasions, including a 1997 opinion letter and a 2010
opinion letter, DOL found that the phrase "changing clothes" under
5 203(o) does not include donning and doffing PPE." 6 The 1997 DOL
opinion letter assumed, without explaining, that 5 203(o) was an
exemption to the FLSA,'" and DOL relied heavily on its own
understanding of the "common usage" of the word "clothes.""' Because
it offered no explanation, and because its argument relied exclusively on
154 See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981) ("The Department's current interpretation, being in
conflict with its initial position, is entitled to considerably less deference."); see also Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines,
Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 698 (1991) ("[T]he case for judicial deference is less compelling with respect to agency
positions that are inconsistent with previously held views."); I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447 n.30
(1987) ("An agency interpretation ofa relevant provision which conflicts with the agency's earlier interpretation
is 'entitled to considerably less deference' than a consistently held agency view" (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S.
259, 273 (1981))).
55 See Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, 644 F.3d 1130, 1139 (10th Cir. 2011) ([W]e decline to defer to ...
any of the [DOL] interpretations. . . . Where, as here, an agency repeatedly alters its interpretation of a statute,
the persuasive power of those interpretations is diminished."); Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 614 (6th
Cir. 2010) ("The DOL's position on this issue has changed repeatedly in the last twelve years, indicating that we
should not defer to its interpretation."); Alvarez v. [IP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 905-06 n. 9 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[W]e
reject the Secretary's new, inconsistent interpretation here."), affld on other grounds, 546 U.S. 21 (2005); see also
Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 599 (7th Cir. 2012) ("It would be a considerable paradox if before
2001 the plaintiffs would win because the President was a Democrat, between 2001 and 2009 the defendant
would win because the President was a Republican, and in 2012 the plaintiffs would win because the President is
again a Democrat. That would make a travesty of the principle of deference to interpretations of statutes by the
agencies responsible for enforcing them, since that principle is based on a belief either that agencies have useful
knowledge that can aid a court or that they are delegates of Congress charged with interpreting and applying their
organic statutes consistently with legislative purpose." (citation omitted)).
15 See DEPT OFz LABOR 1997, supra note 94, at *1; DEP'T 0OF LABOR 2010-2, supra note 108.
i57 See DEP'T OF LABOR 1997, supra note 94, at *1. As noted above, 5 203(o) is most likely not an
exemption from the FLSA. See supra Part IV.B.
iSS See DEP'T oF LABORt 1997, supra note 94, at *1.
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its own understanding of the word's common usage, the 1997 opinion
letter is not entitled to much deference '-that is, even if DOL had not
later contradicted itself on more than one occasion.
The 2010 DOL opinion letter relied heavily on legislative history.16 0
However, its reliance was almost exclusively based on a part of
Representative Herter's statement using the bakery industry as an example
of employees taking time to don and doff PPE. The quote is as follows:
In the bakery industry, for instance . . . there are collective-
bargaining agreements ... In some of those collective-bargaining
agreements[,] the time taken to change clothes . .. is considered a
part of the working day. In other[s] . . . it is not . . . .
DOL understood this quote to mean that the kind of PPE that Congress
had in mind when it passed § 203(o) was the kind of PPE that employees
of the bakery industry donned and doffed in the late 1940s.162 Modern-
day PPE was not meant to be, and is therefore not, included in the term
"clothes" in § 203(o).
The construction of § 203(o) adopted in the 2010 DOL opinion
letter, however, emphasizes a nonessential part of the quote-a for-
instance-and understates its essential aspect-that the collective
bargaining agreements, though varied from union to union, lead to
greater satisfaction overall, which makes the effect offered by § 2 03 (o) the
preferable option. Furthermore, the quote was made before the bill that
would become § 203(o) was narrowed by the Conference Committee to
allow employers and employees to bargain away only time spent
"changing clothes" and not "any time."'6 3  In other words, DOL's
conclusion that the legislative history behind § 203(o) dictates a narrow
reading of the term "clothes" rests on an attenuated assumption derived
159 Relying on a term's common usage, or ordinary meaning, would rarely (if ever) render consistent
opinions due to the subjective nature of such a scheme. Compare Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 904-05 (finding that the
common meaning of "clothes" does not include PPE), with Anderson v. Cagle's, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 955-56
(11th Cir. 2007) ("Thus, we conclude that the [PPE] ... plaintiffs were required to don/doff . .. fit squarely
within the commonly understood definition of'clothes' as that term is used in § 203(o)." (emphasis added)).
160 Do" OF LABOR 2010-2, supra note 108, at 2.
16i 95 CONG. REC. 11,210 (1949) (statement of Rep. Herter)
162 Id, at 2-3 ("The 'clothes' that Congress had in mind in 1949 . . . hardly resemble the modem-day
[PPE] commonly donned and doffed by workers in today's . .. industries . . . .").
163 The quote was preceded by a reading of the bill that would become § 203(o) in its original
incarnation. See 95 CONG. REC. 11,210 (1949) (reading of the clerk) ("[A]mendment offered by Mr. Herter ...
'In determining . . . the hours for which an employee is employed, there shall be excluded any time which was
excluded . . . under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement . . . .' (emphasis added)).
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from a quote whose author envisioned a much broader reach of § 203(o).
Any deference offered to the conclusions of the 2010 DOL opinion letter
is therefore unwarranted.
E. Absurd Results of the Ninth Circuit's Alvarez Decision
Strange results emerge if one takes into account the continuous
workday rule, the Supreme Court decision in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez'6 4-that
donning and doffing PPE are principal activities-and the Ninth Circuit's
holding that non-unique PPE is de minimis. It seems that in the Ninth
Circuit, whether non-unique PPE is compensable depends on the order
in which the employees don and doff PPE. If an employee dons unique
PPE first, the continuous workday rule would be triggered because the
employee would have engaged in his or her first principal activity of the
workday, and any activity beyond that-until the completion of the last
principal activity-is compensable under the FLSA "whether or not the
employee engages in work throughout all of that period."1 6 5 Thus the
Ninth Circuit approach nurtures two strange results if one were to
reconcile it with the Supreme Court decision in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez: first,
compensation for donning and doffing non-unique PPE would turn on
the order in which the employee dons PPE; and second, if after donning
unique PPE the employee dons non-unique PPE, which is de minimis in
the Ninth Circuit and therefore not compensable, a principal activity
would be less worthy of compensation than activities that are not
considered "work."16 6
Beyond the strange results, authorities outside the Ninth Circuit have
not accepted the distinction between unique and non-unique PPE. In
June 2011, the Food Safety and Inspection Service ("FSIS") found that
the distinction between unique and non-unique PPE is a distinction
without a difference.' 6 7 FSIS concluded that classifying some PPE as
164 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
165 29 C.F.R. 5 790.6(b) (2012).
166 This results because the continuous workday rule makes the time an employee spends on activities
that are not "work" nonetheless compensable if it occurs in between the first principal activity and the
completion of the last principal activity. See id. ("[The term] '[w]orkday' as used in the Portal Act means, in
general, the period between the commencement and completion on the same workday of an employee's principal
activity or activities. It includes all time within that period whether or not the employee engages in work throughout all of
that period." (emphasis added)).
167 See FSIS Changes to the Schedule of Operations Regulations, 76 Fed. Reg. 33,974, 33,975 (June 10,
2011) ("FSIS has determined that the FLSA covers time ... spen[t] donning and doffing both unique and non-
unique gear.").
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"non-unique" makes no difference as to whether the acts of donning or
doffing non-unique PPE are less integral or indispensable to an
employee's principal activities.' Furthermore, according to FSIS, the
time that an employee spends donning and doffing non-unique PPE is not
de minimis.' 9
Finally, the Ninth Circuit approach, even if adopted by all other
circuits, would not lead to uniformity. The difference between unique
and non-unique PPE is determined by how easy it is for an employee to
don and doff the PPE."'7 So, the difference between compensable and
non-compensable donning and doffing would be left up to the courts'
determination as to the relative ease of donning and doffing that PPE.
Such a scheme would encourage further litigation and entangle even more
judicial resources.
V. CONCLUSION
Since its enactment, the FLSA has been subject to different
interpretations as to what constitutes compensable work. Congress
attempted to clarify its definition of "work" in 1947 with the Portal-to-
Portal Act to counteract judicial broadening of the definition of "work."
Fearing another series of judicial constructions that would work against
employers, Congress again attempted to solidify the proper definition of
"work" by enacting § 203(o). In another series of statutory construction
disputes, courts have wrestled with the proper definition of "clothes."
The "changing clothes" exception codified in § 203(o) is best
understood as a provision that strengthens the collective bargaining
process between employers and unions. Congressional intent, counseled
by legislative history and a reading of § 203(o) as a whole, caution against
reading the "changing clothes" exception as an exemption to the FLSA.
The time that an employee spends changing clothes is excluded from
"hours worked" by § 203(o), but only if such exclusion is the result of a
collective bargaining agreement. Congress intended to leave the question
of compensation up to the collective bargaining process in order to avoid
unforeseeable and immense liabilities on employers-liabilities that could
have manifested at any moment prior to the enactment of § 203(o).
168 Id. ("The classification of gear as unique or non-unique has no bearing on whether the donning and
doffing of such gear at the workplace is an integral and indispensable activity.").
169 Id. at 33,967-77.
17o See Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2003), affid on other grounds, 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
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